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J ULY-AUGUST, 1958
COLORADO'S NEW DIVORCE LAW
By EDWIN P. VAN CISE
Edwin P. Van Cise received his A.B. degree from the University of Colorado
in 1937 and his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1940. He is a
member of the Denver firm of Van Cise and Van Cise, an associate with the
firm of Knight, Lesher and Schmidt, and a part-time instructor at the Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law. Since 1955 he has served as Chairman of
the Domestic Relations Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
The 1958 General Assembly passed Senate Bill 11, and the bill be-
(ame law when the Governor failed either to sign or veto it. The bill
represents the combined efforts of a large number of lawyers who at one
time or another have served on the Colorado Bar Association's Domestic
Relations and Legislative Committees or who have made constructive
suggestions to them, and of many laymen who have collaborated in its
preparation.
It is not a cure-all. It does not furnish a solution to the basic prob-
lems of imperfect marriages. But it is hoped that it has eliminated some
of the problems inherent in the old law.
MWARRIAGE COUNSELLING
Section 46-1-1 is new. It provides: "It is, and shall be, the
policy of tile State of Colorado to discourage divorce and to pro-
mote and foster the marriage relationship and reconciliation of
estranged spouses; nothing in this act shall be construed to pre-
vent, prohibit, or inhibit domestic relations counselling services
by the courts, by agencies of government, by private agencies or
groups, or by any other qualilied source. It is further declared
to be the policy of the State of Colorado to encourage the estab-
lishment of facilities to assist in the reconciliation of estranged
spouses."
Note that there is nothing mandatory about its terms. it is merely
a statement of policy, without any positive implementation.
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
Section 16-1-2 (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-1-1, 1953) restates the grounds
for divorce. The discretionary language of the old law is retained in the
opening paragraph, which reads:
"Any marriage may be dissolved and divorce granted for
any one or more of the following named reasons; and for no
other cause:"
Thus it is apparent, as before, that even if the grounds are proved the
trier of the facts is still not obligated to grant a divorce.
As to specific grounds, the former grounds of impotency (at time
of marriage, or after marriage "through immoral conduct"), adultery,
wilful desertion without reasonable cause for one year, mental or physical
DICTA
JULY-AUGUST, 1958
cruelty, and non-support of family for one year, are in the new law with-
out word change, as grounds (1), (2), (3) , (4), and (5), respectively.
Only slight changes appear in the old grounds of one year's habitual
drunkenness or drug addiction [new (6) ] and conviction of a felony
[new (7) 1. The words "drug fiend" in the old law were changed to
"drug addict." Conviction of a felony since the marriage was broadened
to include conviction of "a felony in a court of record in any state, terri-
tory, federal district, or United States possession since marriage."
The ground of insanity was reworded [new (8) ]. The main changes
were to reduce the period from 5 to 3 years, to eliminate the necessity
for medical testimony as to incurable insanity, and to change the word-
ing from "adjudged insane" and proved "incurably insane" to a wording
"adjudicated an insane, mentally ill, or mentally deficient person, or a
mental incompetent." It also spells out the requirement of proof that
the spouse "has not, prior to the entry of decree of divorce, been adjudi-
cated restored to reason or competency." The caution as to the con-
tinuing duty of the divorcing husband to support the wife remains in
the law "unless she has sufficient property or means to support herself."
The old ground of bigamy is left out of the new law for obvious
reasons. Proof of a valid marriage has always been considered a pre-
requisite to qualify for a divorce. The 1957 law pertaining to annulment
and determination of marital status amply covers this situation.
A new ground [new (9) ] provides:
"That the parties have lived separate and apart for a period
of three consecutive years, or more, next prior to the commence-
ment of the action for divorce, by force of a decree of a court of
record in any state, territory, or United States possession or dis-
trict."
The italicized words are the key phrase. Mere living apart is insuf-
ficient, unless it has been pursuant to a court decree.
The safeguard provision assuring legitimacy of children of divorce
and their inheritance rights is retained without change.
JURISDICTION
Section 46-1-2 deals with jurisdiction. The wording of the old law
is considerably changed, but there is little change in substance. It should
be noted, however, that the concurrent jurisdiction of the county and
superior court specifies "actions for divorce wherein the complaint shall
aver that the plaintiff does not seek alimony, child support, and division
of property, or either of them, in excess of two theusand dollars in value."
Previously it had been undecided whether the county court had jurisdic-
tion when cumulative child support could exceed the two thousand
dollar limit. Under the new law, it lacks jurisdiction.
Former provisions relating to procedure for transferring the action
to the district court and for pleading an answer were eliminated. The
new law allows the normal procedure applicable in nther civil crtions
to apply here, stating:
"The process, practice, and proceedings shall be in accord-
ance with the rules of civil procedure, except as expressly modi-
fied or otherwise provided in this article."
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A new paragraph has been added which applies when the adverse
party is mentally ill, etc. It specifies that in such a case "the court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for such spouse; service shall be obtained on
such spouse, on the guardian ad litem, and on the conservator of such
spouse, if any." It then sets out as a requirement that "if any relief other
than divorce or child custody is sought, a conservator shall be a party to
the action."
REsII)IrNCE - VENUE OF AcTION
Section 46-1-3 should be studied carefully to avoid misunderstand-
ing. There are three significant changes in the old law on this subject.
Formerly, the residence of the plaintiff was the controlling factor,
although this had been widened by COurt decision to allow a non-resident
defendant to secure by counterclaim a divorce from a resident plaintiff.'
The new law allows a divorce if "one spouse has been a bona fide resident
of this state during the one year next prior to the commencement of the
action."
The old law had specified that the action could be commenced only
in the county of the plaintiff's or the defendant's residence or in which
the defendant last resided. This had been determined to be jurisdic-
tional, and divorces obtained in counties other than the ones so desig-
nated have been held void by our supreme court.2
The new law makes no mention of the county in which the action
shall be filed, and it goes further, to provide: "The venue of the action
shall be as provided by the rules of civil procedure."'
It is submitted that it was the intention in this new law to overrule
the old decisions that venue was lurisdictional in divorce actions.
A new sentence appears in the new law, providing that:
"The wife shall not be considered to have the residence
of the husband based merely on the marriage relationship."
This provision may have far-reaching implications. Its application
to service marriages is at once apparent.
DEFENSES TO DIVORCE
This is an entirely new section, supplanting old sections 4 and 8.
The only defenses to a divorce action are spelled out in Section 46-
1-4. By its limitations, recrimination (denying a divorce when both
parties are guilty old section 4] ) is no longer a defense or a bar to a
divorce.
The other common law defenses, not previously contained in the
statute but generally recognized as available, are set forth in the new law.
These are (1) Lack of jurisdiction, (2) Failure to establish a case,
(3) Collusion (4) Condonation, (5) Connivance, and (6) Fraud on
the court. Collusion, condonation and connivance are specifically defined
in the law, but with the usual common law definitions.
The new law specifies that:
"In no event shall a party be precluded from introducing
evidence to show extenuation, provocation, mitigation, or justi-
fication concerning the acts complained of by the cther party."
1 Harms v. Harms, 120 Colo. 209 P.2d 552 (1949).
2 People ex rel. Plunkett v. District Court, 127 Colo. 483. 258 P.2d 483 (1953);
Hilliard v. Klein, 124 Colo. 479, 238 P.2d 882 (1951): Branch v. Branch, 30 Colo. 499,
71 Pac. 632 (1902); People ex rel. Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123. 69 Pac. 597
(1902).
3 See Colo. R. Civ. P. 98 (c).
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This appears to remedy the present situation where, for failure to plead
the above, on occasions the party has been barred from introducing such
evidence. On the other hand, it appears to regard such matters not as
affirmative defenses but merely as negations or minimizations of oppos-
ing evidence.
A significant new provision is in the last paragraph which shows
how completely the old theory of recrimination has been reversed. It pro-
vides that:
"If, upon the trial of an action for divorce, either or both
of the parties shall be found guilty of any one, or more, of the
grounds for divorce, then a divorce may be granted to either, or
both, of said parties in accordance with such findings."
Note that the trier of facts still has discretion-the word "may" is
included. The concept of a "guilty" party-inherent in the adversary
theory of civil actions-is retained, but much of the stigma is removed by
allowing the granting of a divorce to either or both. This same idea is
repeated in new Section 46-1-9.
ALIMONY - CUSTODY OF CHILDREN - PROPERTY DIVISION
Decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court have done little to clarify
the law concerning alimony and property division and the time for seek-
ing and obtaining the same.' The new law, new Section 46-1-5, it is hoped,
presents a clearer statement.
Paragraph (1) specifies that:
"At all times after the filing of the complaint, whether be-
fore or after the issuance of a divorce decree, the court may
make such orders, if any, as the circumstances of the case may
warrant for:
" (a) Custody of minor children;
" (1)) Care and support of children dependent upon the
parent or parents for support;
" (c) Alimony;
" (d) Suit money, court costs, and attorney fees; and
" (e) Any other matters (except division of property) in
controversy between the parties."
This eliminates the confusing wording in the old law providing for
"alimony and counsel fees pendente lite" and for alimony, etc. "when a
divorce has been granted." Desirable or not, the new law permits these
matters to be taken care of "whether before or after divorce." Subject
to court discretion, it appears to allow a wife or ex-wife (in the absence of
a release or waiver) to seek alimony for the first time at a date consider-
ably later than the entry of a decree, and to assure that her attorney has
a right to fees on matters arising after the divorce. No change is made,
however, in basic law pertaining to what must be alleged in the original
complaint, or in the consequences from not having a sufficiently inclusive
prayer in the complaint. Obligation for support of "children" appears
to be extended beyond minority in the situation where such child is
"dependent ...for support."
Paragraph (2) sets the time for dividing the property-which is far
4 Vines v. Vines, 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 329 (1958) (Separate maintenance
case); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 323 P.2d 892 (1958); Gregory v. Gregory, 130 Colo. 489, 276
P.2d 750 (1954); Ikeler v. Ikeler, 84 Colo. 429, 271 Pac. 193 (1928).
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from clear in the old law. The new law specifies that it shall be done
"at the time of the issuance of a divorce decree, or at some reasonable
time thereafter as may be set by the court at the time of the issuance
of said divorce decree."
No definite formula is prescribed, the reasonable discretion of tile
court remaining the only controlling factor, in the wording "such orders,
if any, as the circumstances of the case may warrant relative to division
of property, in such proportions as may be fair and equitable."
The old law limited the right to security to orders for alimony.' The
new law, in paragraph (3) gives the court "the power to reqbire security
to be given to insure enforcement of its orders"--thus covering any and
all orders in the action.
There was previously much uncertainty, to say the least, as to the
right of a court after entry of decree to go into matters which could not
have been passed on due to lack of personal jurisdiction over tile defend-
ant. Paragraph (4) of the new law specifies that the court "shall retain
jurisdiction of the action . .. for the purpose of hearing any matters
recited in (1) , (2) and (3) of this section which it was unable to deter-
mine at earlier hearings for lack of personal jurisdiction over one of the
parties." This is also extended to clarify its rights to reopen for other
reasons, retaining jurisdiction in the court to hear any of such matters
"which it was unable to determine ...for lack of knowledge or informa-
tion, or because of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment."
Any doubts about the rights to modify or change previous orders are
resolved in the wording that "the court shall retain jurisdiction of the
action for the purpose of such later revisions of its orders pertaining to
• . . [custody, support, alimony, suit noney, court costs, attorney tees,
other matters (except division of property) , and requirements for secur-
ity] as changing circumstances may require."
Paragraph (5) repeats the old law about termination of rights to
alimony on remnarriage, but makes it apply even if the remarriage is "void
or voidable." It allows the parties to provide otherwise by "written
agreement or stipulation."
Paragraph (6) affects the old decision' which held that, on failure
to set forth verbatim in the decree the provisions of an agreement, the
divorce court lacked the power to enforce the agreement. The new law
specifies that:
"Any written agreement or stipulation by the parties as
to any of the above matters, when incorporated in an order or
decree or when filed in the action and referred to and approved
and adopted in any order or decree, shall become a part of such
order or decree."
TRIAL NINETY DAYS AFTER SERVICE - DISMiISSAL
The old law had specified that there could be no trial until 30 days
after filing the action. New Section 46-1-7 specifies:
"No trial for an action for divorce shall be had until at
least 90 days after service of process; provided, however, upon
Brown v. Brown, 131 Colo. 280, 283 P.2d 951 (1955); cf. Vines v. Vines, note 4
supra.
6 Campbell v. Goodbar. 110 Colo. 403, 134 P.2d 1060 (1943); McWilliams v. Mc-
Williams. 110 Colo. 173, 132 P.2d 966 (1942); Hall v. Hall. 105 Colo. 227. 97 P.2d 415
(1939): Kastner v. Kastner. 90 Colo. 280, 9 P.2d 290 (1932).
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motion of either party, the court shall continue said trial for an
additional 30 days, and the court may, upon motion of either
party, or upon its own motion, grant other and. additional con-
tinuances, from time to time."
And opponents called this a Quickie Divorce Bill!
The new law also provides for dismissal with prejudice if not tried
within a year after commencement of the action. This is mandatory
("shall be dismissed") "on motion of the court or of either party, except
for good cause shown."
DECREE FINAL ON ENTRY
Old Section 46-1-9 made the decree final six months after entry of
interlocutory decree, and allowed dismissal within that period for good
cause shown. "Good cause" had been interpreted as an), reason at all, if
requested by the "innocent" party.'
New Section 46-1-9 provides for only one decree, final on entry. It
states:
"After the trial of an action for divorce, the court shall
enter a judgment or decree dismissing the action or granting a
final decree of divorce to either or both parties."
SECTIONS RETAINED UNCHANGED
Old Section 46-1-11 (appeals as in other civil cases) and Section
46-1-15 (indigent women may sue without payment of costs) are un-
changed.'
SECTIONS REPEALED
Former Section 46-1-6 (jury trial may be waived) comes out as un-
necessary. R.C.P. applies as in other civil actions. Note, jury trial re-
quests are probably now required within the standard 10 day rate.
Old Section 46-1-8 (dismissal in event of collusion) is repealed. The
gist is included in new Section 46-1-4 on defenses.
Former Section 46-1-10 (decree final in 6 months, separate final
decree not required) is eliminated. See new Section 46-1-9.
Old Section 46-1-12 (applicability to pre-1933 proceedings) goes
out as no longer necessary. See new Section 10.
Former Section 46-1-13 (policy to resolve divorce actions) is re-
pealed. The new policy (favoring reconciliation) is set forth in the
opening section of the 1958 law.
Old Section 46-1-14 (one year to set aside divorce, except for lack
of jurisdiction or fraud on court) is eliminated. R.C.P. applies as in
other civil actions.
EFFECTIVE DATE - EARLIER ACTIONS
By Section 46-1-11 of the new law, the act "shall take effect and be
in force from and after July 1, 1958." It is submitted that the safest in-
terpretation is that July 2 is the effective date.
Section 46-1-10 of the 1958 law makes its provisions apply only to
actions commenced after the effective date: "Statutes in effect prior to
the effective date of this act shall apply to all actions commenced prior
to said date."
7 Doty v. Doty, 103 Colo. 543, 88 P.2d 573 (1939).
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